India: Chhattisgarh: Biding Time

Chhattisgarh: Biding Time
Fakir Mohan Pradhan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On January 18, 2013, an Indian Air Force (IAF) helicopter on a rescue mission to evacuate two troopers who were injured in a gunfight near Puswada in the Sukma District of Chhattisgarh was hit twice by Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) small arms fire. A Chhattisgarh Police radio operator on board took a bullet hit. The chopper turned back without evacuating the injured troopers but crash landed a few kilometers after it reversed course, at a clearing between the Timal Wada and Chintagufa areas, when its hydraulic system and generator failed. The IAF crew abandoned the chopper and the injured radio operator at the crash site and walked back to a Central Reserve police Force (CRPF) camp in the Chintagufa area, roughly three kilometers away. The incident generated heated controversy over the decision of the IAF personnel to abandon the injured radio operator. The policeman was rescued four hours later, in critical condition, when reinforcements arrived.

Though it was reported to be ‘first incident of its kind’, Maoist firing on helicopters is not new. Some earlier incidents include:

• April 5, 2012: ABorder Security Force (BSF) Helicopter, which was flying from Latehar to Ranchi in Jharkhand with two injured personnel, was fired at by Maoists. It was subsequently grounded, on April 11 because of the damages it received in the firing.
• December 19, 2011: An IAF helicopter which had been sent to help the Police-CRPF operation in Dantewada District of Chhattisgarh came under Maoist fire and was hit by nine rounds, including two shots in the rotor of the helicopter. However, the pilot managed to fly back safely with five troopers onboard.
• May 15, 2009: A Police constable, identified as Laxmi Narayan Dhurv, was killed and another injured when Maoists opened fire at a helicopter and at the Security Forces who were guarding the helipad at Kistaram village in Dantewada District of Chhattisgarh. However, the pilot managed to take off and evacuate the helicopter from the incident site.
• November 14, 2008: A non-commissioned officer of the IAF, identified as Sergeant Mustafa Ali, was killed and a Squadron Leader identified as, T.K. Chaudhury, was injured in a CPI-Maoist attack on their helicopter as soon as it took off from Bijapur in Chhattisgarh.
• August 30, 2007: Maoists opened fire at the helicopter carrying the Director-General of Police, Viswa Ranjan and Inspector General of Police (Bastar Range), R. K. Vij, in the Chintalnar village area of Dantewada District of Chhattisgarh. But the helicopter was not hit.

Anticipating the deployment of ‘air power’ against them, the Maoists have, in fact, been preparing to counter this new dimension of war. Documents seized from Maoists demonstrate that the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA), the military wing of the CPI-Maoist, has been training cadres to counter aerial attacks. The Special Intelligence Branch of Andhra Pradesh Police recovered key documents and sketches with details of how Maoists intended to defend against air attacks and to capture airports. A revamped manual for military training of Maoist cadres, titled Guerrilla Air Defence and written by the ‘central military commissioner’ and senior Maoist, Tipparthi Tirupati alias ‘Devji’ of Andhra Pradesh, was, consequently, introduced into the Maoist syllabus.

The use of choppers for injury evacuation has been necessitated not only to cut down the time for medical aid, but also to avoid ambush and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks, which are frequent.

Chhattisgarh Director General of Police (DGP) Ramniwas believes, “the Naxalite problem was very much under control” in the State. Maoist violence has certainly decreased in Chhattisgarh, in conformity with the all-India trend, but the degree of ‘control’ presently exercised by state agencies remains debatable.

Fatalities in LWE/ CPI-Maoist Violence in Chhattisgarh and All India: 2011-2012

Years	2011				2012
Category	Civilian	SFs	Maoists	Total	Civilian	SFs	Maoists	Total
Chhattisgarh	124	80	34	238	63	46	38	147
All India	469	142	99	710	300	114	74	488

Source: Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA)

According to MHA data, the state recorded fewer fatalities in Maoist-related violence, at 147 – including 63 civilians, 46 SFs and 38 Maoists – in 2012; as against a total of 238 fatalities – 124 civilians, 80 SFs and 34 Maoists in 2011. The marginal increase in Maoists fatalities, especially in the face of a significant decline in SF fatalities, may be deceptive, as many Maoist ‘kills’ are not matched by the recovery of bodies, and many so-called ‘Maoists’ are, in fact, mis-categorized civilians. In the June 28-29, 2012, Sarkeguda encounter, for instance, it was initially claimed that at least 19 Maoists had been killed; a judicial commission is now enquiring into the matter after widespread allegation that innocent civilians had been killed in the encounter.

Partial data compiled by South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) indicates that the State recorded seven major incidents (involving three or more fatalities) in 2012, as against 13 in 2011.

In 2013, up to March, the Maoists had killed nine civilians and one SF trooper, while five Maoists had been killed in encounters with the SFs.

A range of other parameters also indicate a slowdown in Maoist activity in Chhattisgarh. Nevertheless, three significant indicators – number of attacks on Police, arms training camps held and Jan Adalats (‘People’s Courts’, kangaroo courts organized by the Maoists) organized – report no decline. In fact, the number of Jan Adalats held increased from 13 to 16 between 2011 and 2012, indicating greater control over areas in which such kangaroo courts were organized.  Moreover, while the number of attacks on the Police rose marginally, the number of encounters with the Police declined, even as did the total number of incidents, suggesting a decline in offensive operations by the SFs.

Other Parameters of LWE/CPI-Maoist Violence in Chhattisgarh: 2011-2012

Parameters	2011	2012
No. of incidents	465	369
Police Informers' Killed (Out of total civilians killed)	91	35
No. of encounters with police	99	88
No. of attacks on police (including landmines)	75	76
No. of Naxalites arrested	509	397
No. of Naxalites surrendered	20	26
Total no. of arms snatched	29	17
Total no. of arms recovered	108	91
Arms training camps held	24	24
No of Jan Adalats held	13	16

Source: MHA

Indeed, the high profile abduction of Sukma District Collector Alex Paul Menon, exposed the security vulnerabilities of the State. The Government was forced to reach out to the Maoists through a mediator who eventually negotiated Menon’s release. Though the agreement signed did not concede much, it appears, there was an informal understanding not to oppose the bail applications of some Maoists under detention.

Pressure to perform has, of course, forced the SFs to engage in some offensive operations, and at least one of these went terribly wrong. In the intervening night of June 28 and 29, 2012, at least 19 ‘Maoists’ were declared to have been killed. During the operation, three encounters were reported – at Silger, Sarkeguda and Chimlipenta – in Sukma and Bijapur Districts. The overwhelming proportion of fatalities occurred in the Sakeguda encounter, where 17 ‘Maoists’ were killed. However, there were widespread allegations that most of those killed were innocent villagers. Even the CRPF eventually claimed that only seven of the dead were ‘known Maoists’. Following public outrage, Chhattisgarh, on July 5, 2012, ordered a judicial enquiry into the episode, by Justice (Retd.) V.K. Agarwal. The enquiry could start only in December, as the office for the enquiry commission was not made available till early November. The initial deadline for filing of complaints was January 14, 2013, but was extended to February 12, 2013 on the basis of applications and affidavits filed by the villagers under the Basaguda Police Station area. The inquiries of the commission are still ongoing.

Earlier, between March 5 and 20, 2012, an anti-Maoist operation, variously codenamed "Maad", "Kilam" and "Podku," was carried out in the Abujhmaad Forest, considered to be the CPI-Maoist ‘central guerilla zone’ and headquarters. IG (Operations), Chhattisgarh, Pankaj Singh, disclosed that 33 Maoist cadres were arrested during the operation.

Further, after the lid over the Maoists’ weapons manufacture programme was blown off with the arrest of Sadanala Ramakrishna alias RK in Kolkata, SFs raided the premises of two transporters in Raipur and seized a huge quantity of materials reportedly meant for manufacturing rocket launchers and grenades.

According to SATP, incidents of killings were reported from at least 11 Districts (out of a total of 27 in the State) – Bijapur, Kanker, Sukma, Rajnandgaon, Dantewada, Kondagaon, Gariabandh, Raipur, Narayanpur, Raigarh and Dhamtari. Most of the incidents of arson, abduction and blasts triggered by Maoists were reported from these Districts. In 2011, 14 out of a total of 19 Districts were Maoist-affected (existing Districts were subdivided to add eight new Districts in 2012).

Worryingly, after a gap of three years, there was a visible rise in Maoist attacks on persons associated with Salwa Judum (a state-backed anti-Maoist vigilante group) in 2012. At least seven civilians associated with Salwa Judum were killed in 2012, as against one in 2011. Among those killed were Lachhuram Kashyap, a prominent Salwa Judum leader of Mirtur; Chika Mazi, who actively participated in Salwa Judum in Bastar; and Chhinnaram Gota of Bijapur District. Further, Mahendra Karma, who led the Salwa Judum in the State, had a miraculous escape when his convoy hit a landmine on November 8, 2012. The renewed targeting of Salwa Judum leaders suggests that the Maoists are ‘comfortable’ with the present level of engagement with the SFs, as they would be unlikely to renew old enmities if they were under extraordinary pressure from the SFs.

Further, on February 11, 2012, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) recovered two IEDs (one weighing 40 kilograms and the other 20 kilograms) hidden three feet below the surface on the busy Kohka-Manpur Road (a black-top road) in Rajnandgaon District. The Maoists also blew up a Mine Protected Vehicle (MPV) killing a CRPF trooper and injuring five in Dantewada District on August 6, 2012.

State authorities may assert that ‘Naxal situation is very much under control’, but Union Rural Development Minister Jairam Ramesh warned, on July 1, 2012, "Abujhmaad is a liberated zone where Governments have not been able to reach. It is not possible for our Ministry to carry out any development programme there." While the Minister’s definition of ‘liberated zones’ may not coincide with the classical Maoist notion – even the Maoists do not consider Abujhmaad a liberated area – the difficulties of carrying out developmental activities in Abujhmaad are manifest. [For the Maoists, the concept of a liberated area is much broader than mere disruptive dominance in an area].

It is, of course, the case that Maoist disruptive dominance remains widespread across Chhattishgar. According to the July 2012 report of the Chhattisgarh Public Works Department (PWD), in the preceding three years, only two of 30 roads sanctioned, have been completed under the MHA’s development programme. While 15 of the 30 projects approved in 2010 or earlier are stuck at various stages of bidding or awarding of tenders, in the remaining 13 projects contractors have stopped execution of works, allegedly due to Maoist threat. According to an unnamed senior Union Home Ministry official cited by The Hindu, however, “The contractors themselves burn their machineries in some cases or fund renegade Maoist groups to do that, after taking an advance. If an interest free work advance of 20 crore is returned after three years, without even a scratch on the road, imagine how much [money] the contractor is making by investing it in the market in the name of Maoists.”

Meanwhile, the Centre was worried that the Bhilai Steel Plant in Chhattisgarh would have to be closed down over the next three years, as it runs out of iron ore supplies. Such a situation has arisen due to bitter Maoist opposition to mining in a new area called Rowghat, as well as to the construction of a railway line to transport the iron ore from Rowghat to the plant. The new mining project involves deforestation in an area of over 2,030 hectares in Kanker and Narayanpur Districts. Further, the proposed 235-km railway line would have to run through the Abujhmaad area. All of these areas are Maoist strong-holds.

The decline in violence notwithstanding, the Maoist threat in Chhattisgarh remains vibrant, and the State’s capacities to counter it, limited. The dangers of escalation, by either side, are ever-present, and state adventurism, without adequate preparation and capacity-building, may well lead to disasters comparable to the many debacles of the past. The essentials of a coherent strategy – a reality based assessment of threat, of capacities and resources for condign response, and a deployment of these within a calculated framework of response – remain conspicuous in their absence.

Terrorism-related incidents in Delhi since 1997

• December 20: Top HM 'commander' Chota Haafiz alias Shakir Ahmad, who is also wanted in connection with September 7, 2011, Delhi High Court blast, was shot dead by the SFs at village Qadarna of Navapachi locality in Kishtwar District of Jammu and Kashmir.
  Four IM militants, already in Delhi Police custody arrested by Maharashtra ATS in connection with Pune serial blasts (August 1, 2012) and remanded in Police custody till January 1.
• December 4: UMHA Sushilkumar Shinde said that the MHA has not yet taken any decision on the mercy petition of Parliament attack (December 13, 2001) case convict Afzal Guru.
• December 1: The Delhi Police has charge-sheeted a suspected IM operative, Kamal Hassan alias Bilal for his alleged role in the Jama Masjid (Delhi) blast-cum-shootout case of September 19, 2010. He is also an accused in Bangalore's (Karnataka) Chinnaswamy Stadium blast case of April 17, 2010.
• November 27: The Government of India declared that 71 spies were arrested by Security Forces..For more visit us

NEPAL 

 

Consolidating the Peace
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

The peace accord signed on November 21, 2006, appears to be approaching a logical culmination, with the Nepal Army (NA) taking final control over the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), the armed wing of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M), on April 10, 2012. The dismantling of the PLA has brought the process of Army integration, the major stumbling block to the implementation of the 2006 Agreement, to its final phase.

Prime Minister (PM) Baburam Bhattarai, who also heads the constitutionally mandated Army Integration Special Committee (AISC), told the Committee on April 10, 2012, that the NA was going to move into all 15 PLA cantonments, take full control, and seize more than 3,000 weapons locked in containers lying there. He added that the process would be completed by the evening of April 12. However, following reports of clashes in the cantonments, the PM met the NA chief, Chhattra Man Singh Gurung, in the evening of April 10, and directed him to implement the decisions of the AISC. NA troops took charge of the cantonments and the weapons’ containers the same day.

Significantly, the second phase of the regrouping process, which had begun on April 8, 2012, had vitiated the environment in the cantonments. Consequently, the process was halted on April 10 at the request of the Maoist leadership. It was, however, restarted on April 13, and, as of April 19, 2012, when it was finally concluded, there were only 3,129 former PLA combatants left for integration into the NA. A total of 6,576 combatants chose the Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS), and will be provided with cheques in the range of NPR 500,000 to NPR 800,000, depending on their ranks. On April 10, 2012, moreover, the AISC reiterated that the VRS option would be kept open for combatants as long as the integration process was not concluded.

In the first phase (November 18 to December 1, 2011) of regrouping, 9,705 former combatants had chosen integration into the NA. In a landmark achievement, the AISC had initiated the process of integration following a November 1, 2011, seven-point deal signed by three major political parties – UCPN-M, Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) and Nepali Congress (NC) – and the umbrella formation of several Madheshi groups, the United Democratic Madheshi Front (UDMF). The deal provided three options to former PLA combatants – integration, voluntary retirement and rehabilitation. A total of 16,997 PLA combatants were subsequently ‘regrouped’. While 9,705 combatants opted for integration, 7,286 chose voluntary discharge, and six combatants registered their names for rehabilitation packages. The United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) had registered 19,602 combatants in the second verification conducted on May 26, 2007.

The PLA was founded in 2002 in the midst of the Civil War initiated by the Maoists in 1996, and was led by UCPN-M chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda. In September 2008, Nanda Kishor Pun was appointed new ‘chief commander’ of the PLA, after Prachanda became Nepal's Prime Minister.

The two phases of regrouping exposed Maoist attempts to inflate the number of PLA combatants, and also deflated the Maoist demand for the integration of more than the stipulated 6,500 combatants in the Army. Worried by their weakening political control and by intra-party feuds, the Maoists had sought to increase their barraging power in negotiations by inflating the size of their combat forces.

Apprehensions of violence by restive combatants held in the cantonments for well over five years, forced the Maoist leadership to a resolution that was marked by some recent haste. Prachanda, for instance, on April 11, termed the move to hand over Maoist combatants, their arms, and the cantonments to the NA, a “bold decision” and observed, “Yesterday’s decision [to hand over combatants and weapons] was made after activities aimed at disrupting integration were intensified.” Reacting on Vice Chairman Mohan Baidya’s opposition to the decision and simultaneous protests, he added, “The protests by the faction of Kiran ji [Baidya] was part of their responsibility. This [protest] is like their regular job. But, now petty issues should not be bickered over… Peace process has almost concluded, only certain technical issues remain. Now, we need to move forward on the Constitution writing process.” Earlier, opposing the integration process, Baidya, who according to Maoist assessments, controlled 30 per cent of the Maoist combatants, had termed the integration deal a “sell-out” and had reportedly encouraged dissent within the camps. Clashes had erupted at several Maoist camps after combatants accused party leaders and commanders of ‘corruption’ and bias in the integration process.

An April 14, 2012, AISC decision laid down that the ranks of the integrated combatants would be determined according to the NA’s, and not the PLA’s, standards. A Selection Committee would be headed by the Chairman of Nepal’s Public Service Commission (PSC) or by a member appointed by him, and a General Directorate would be created under the NA, headed by a Lieutenant General, to absorb the integrated combatants. The combatants will have to undergo between three and nine months of training, depending on their ranks. The Directorate would only be deployed for disaster relief, industrial security, development, and forest and environment conservation. On April 17, moreover, the NA stated that it could not start the recruitment process of former Maoist combatants until the structure—leadership and size—of the General Directorate had been finalised at the political level.

Conspicuously, despite reports of strong opposition from some sections of former PLA combatants and resultant clashes, as well as a degree of ambiguity on the mode of integration, the integration process now appears to have become irreversible. An unnamed NC leader thus noted, “The trigger may have been negative, but with this step, the peace process is now irreversible. For its own interest, the Maoist leadership will push through the integration process.”

Ram Chandra Poudel, leader of the NC Parliamentary Party, observed, further, “It (PLA’s integration into the NA) is a very important step towards the transformation of the Maoist party into a civilian party.” The peace process is now expected to be expedited, as the main demand of the two major non-Maoist political formations – CPN-UML and NC – has now been met. Parties also believe that the Maoists, minus the combatants, will have to be more flexible about contentious issues that have blocked the drafting of the constitution.

Indeed, on April 19, 2012, the three major political parties agreed to merge two separate proposed commissions on Truth and Reconciliation, and on Disappearances, into one. Bills for the formation of both of the Commissions are still under consideration in Parliament. The appointment of such Commissions was one of the components of the peace process, and was also part of the Comprehensive Peace Accord. 

Earlier, on April 18, 2012, the Government inked a six-point agreement with Samyukta Krantikari Terai Madhesh Mukti Morcha (SKTMMM), an underground armed outfit active in Terai, bringing another armed group into the peace process. According to the agreement, the SKTMMM expressed commitment to embrace peaceful politics and to give up violence and armed activities; to work towards ensuring peace; and to hand over all arms to the Government. In return, the Government agreed to treat the outfit as a political group rather than as a terrorist organization; guarantee security to the Morcha Coordinator and Joint Coordinator during the talks; withdraw criminal cases lodged against the Morcha's cadres; and release those in the Government's custody, with due procedure.

On the draft Constitution, in an interview with The Hindu, published on April 16, 2012, Prachanda stated that an all-party taskforce had submitted a proposal that there should be a directly elected President, and a PM elected by the Parliament — with power sharing between the two. This, he clarified, was the meeting point between divergent perspectives articulated by the parties. He also stated that, in principle, there was agreement that identity and capability should be the basis for federalism. Meanwhile, the major political parties, on April 22, reached an understanding to adopt a mixed system of governance in which executive powers would be shared between a directly-elected President and a Parliament-elected Prime Minister. The leaders also agreed on a directly-elected Vice President. “The executive powers will be shared between the popularly-elected head of State and the Prime Minister elected by Parliament,” Minister for Physical Planning Hridayesh Tripathi stated.

There are, nevertheless, several issues, including federalism, the judiciary, the electoral system and investigation of human rights violations during the conflict years, on which consensus is yet to be reached. Further, the issue of returning of properties confiscated by the Maoists from individual citizens during the conflict remains unresolved. The political rift within the Maoist party has, moreover, translated into operational disunity within the group. Sources indicate that the Baidya faction commands the loyalty of some 80 of 240 Maoist Members of Parliament (MPs) in the Constituent Assembly, and has the support of some 50 of 147 members of the party’s Central Committee.

In another divisive development, the Bhattarai Government unilaterally withdrew cases of human rights violation, including those of murder and abductions, against party leaders and cadres. On April 1, 2012, the Supreme Court (SC) issued an interim order, ordering the Government not to implement this decision, in response to a petition filed by Rupaiya Devi Kairin of Rautahat District. A two-judge bench issued the order regarding the February 27, 2012, Government decision to withdraw murder cases against six persons. The case was filed at the District Court on September 30, 2009, on the charge of the murder of Dev Sharan Mahato.

Given the exigencies of the situation and rising popular pressure to wrap up the unending ‘transition’, the Government is now trying to intensify the peace process. On April 22, 2012, it registered a bill in the Parliament Secretariat to amend Article 70 of the Interim Constitution in order to shorten the procedure for the promulgation of the new Constitution, which, at present, is somewhat protracted, so that the stipulated deadline of May 27, 2012, can be met. The term of the Constituent Assembly (CA) has already been extended four times beyond its original two-year term, and will expire on this date according to a SC declaration that the current extension would be final. If the Constitution is not promulgated, another election or referendum would have to be held, an option none of the parties is eager to embrace.

Finally, the possibility of installing a Constitution and Constitutional Government in this fractious nation now appears to be within grasp.

 

 

• PAKISTAN: Sectarianism: Savage Campaign - Ambreen Agha 

• Now jihad against the Shia-Hazara has become our duty. We will rest only after hoisting the flag of true Islam on the land of the pure – Pakistan.”Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) warning letter the Shia-Hazaras (June 2011)

  Violence against the Shi’ite minority has long been endemic in Pakistan, with a progressive increase in scale and geographical distribution over time. Living in absolute fear, the Shia community, variously estimated at between five and 20 per cent of Pakistan’s 187 million population, is currently being targeted in an escalating and vicious cycle of sectarian attacks that have enveloped the entire country.
  The idea of Shias as a ‘heretical’ sect has become an entrenched dogma of mainstream Sunni politics in Pakistan. On April 18, 2012, National Assembly Standing Committee (NSC) during a meeting told the National Assembly Human Rights Committee (NAHRC) that more than 650 Shias in Quetta, the provincial capital of Balochistan, and 450 in the Dera Ismail Khan District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) were targeted and killed ‘recently’ (no date was specified) though the statement was issued in the context of the Shia-Hazara killings between March 29 and April 17, 2012.)
  According to partial data compiled by South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) there have been at least 772 incidents of sectarian violence in Pakistan from January 1, 2005, to April 22, 2012, which have claimed at least 2,175 lives [these are likely to be underestimates, as information flows from many of the conflict-ridden regions of Pakistan are severely restricted].

  Years	Incidents	Killed
  2005	62	160
  2006	38	201
  2007	341	441
  2008	97	306
  2009	106	190
  2010	57	509
  2011	30	203
  2012	41	165
  Total*	772	2175

  Source: SATP, *Data till April 22, 2012
  SATP has recorded a total of 41 incidents of sectarian attacks, resulting in at least 165 fatalities since the beginning of 2012 (till April 22). The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) experienced the highest number of such killings, while Balochistan accounted for highest number of such incidents. FATA recorded 43 killings in two incidents, followed by Balochistan, with 37 killings in 15 incidents; KP, 23 killing in five incidents; Punjab, 21 fatalities in two incidents; Gilgit-Baltistan, 24 fatalities in three different incidents on a single day; and Sindh, nine killings in six incidents.
  All six regions of Pakistan have witnessed Shia killings, but the pattern and trend of such attacks varies. In KP, Punjab, FATA and Gilgit-Baltistan, attacks have ordinarily targeted large Shia gatherings. In Sindh – particularly in its provincial capital Karachi – and in Balochistan, ‘target killings’ ordinarily use small arms to execute individual or small group assassinations. In Karachi, moreover, eminent Shias, often drawn from educated and professional classes, have been particularly targeted. Prominent among such incidents in 2012 were:
  April 17: The Vice Principal of Jinnah Polytechnic Institute, Imran Zaidi (55), was shot dead near the Matric Board Office in the Nazimabad area.
  March 24: Former President of Malir Bar Association Salahuddin Jaffery (64), and his son, identified as Ali Raza Jaffery (35), were shot dead within the jurisdiction of Malir City Police Station.
  January 31: Doctor Ashfaq Ahmed Qazi was shot dead near Malir railway crossing within the precinct of Saudabad Police Station.
  Hazara-Shias, a Dari-speaking ethnic tribe dispersed across Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, believed to be of Turk-Mongol descent, have been particularly targeted in Balochistan in a recent series of indiscriminate killings at tea shops or bus stops, by two separate and virulently anti-Shia militant outfits, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Jandullah, between March 26 and April 15, 2012, which claimed at least 28 Hazara-Shia lives. A spokesman for the LeJ, Ali Sher Haidri, claimed responsibility for these attacks. Major incidents (involving more than three fatalities) this year, targeting ethnic Hazara-Shias in Balochistan, include:
  April 14: Unidentified armed assailants killed eight Hazara Shias in two separate incidents of sectarian attack in Quetta.
  April 12: Three people belonging to the Hazara community were shot dead and another was wounded in separate incidents of target killings in Quetta. The same day, armed assailants attacked another shop on Archer Road killing two people belonging to the Hazara community on the spot.
  April 9: Six people belonging to the Hazara community were killed and three were injured when armed militants opened fire at a cobbler's shop on Prince Road in Quetta.
  March 29: At least five Hazaras were killed and another seven were injured, when unidentified militants opened fire on their car on Spiny Road in Quetta. Jandullah claimed responsibility for the attack.
  Apart from attacks on the ‘ethnic’ Hazara-Shia in Balochistan, the Shia community has, in general, been a target of violent sectarian reprisals in other provinces of Pakistan. Prominent anti-Shia attacks in 2012 in other regions include:
  April 3: 24 people were killed and another 55 were injured in a fresh wave of sectarian violence across Gilgit-Baltistan, which erupted after clashes between members of the Ahl-e-Sunnat-Wal-Jama’at (ASWJ) and the Police, in which five persons were killed in Gilgit city of Gilgit-Baltistan.
  February 28: Armed militants dressed in military uniforms killed at least 18 Shias, all men, from Gilgit-Baltistan, on the Karakoram Highway in the Kohistan District of KP, while they were returning in a convoy from a pilgrimage in Iran.
  February 17: At least 40 Shias were reportedly killed and another 24 were injured, after a suicide bomber detonated his explosives just near a Shia mosque in the Kurmi Bazaar in Parachinar, the main town of the Kurram Agency in FATA.
  January 15: At least 18 Shias were killed in Khanpur city of Rahim Yar Khan District in Punjab during a chehlum (40^th day of Imam Hussein’s martyrdom) procession.
  An April 11, 2012, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) report on sectarian violence in Pakistan observed that the continuing blood-letting in sectarian killings in Quetta and Gilgit Baltistan manifested a total failure on the part of the state to address religious intolerance in society, which constitutes one of the biggest threats to the country. The Commission noted:

  HRCP is alarmed by the continuing sectarian bloodshed in Pakistan, particularly in Quetta and Gilgit Baltistan. The killings demonstrate a disturbing pattern and appear to be part of a well-planned sequence... The mindless bloodshed that we witness day in and day out is rooted in religious intolerance cultivated by the state. Politics in the name of religion has substantially worsened what was already an appalling situation. It is alarming that no one responsible for these killings has been nabbed in years...

  Neither Federal nor the State Governments have, thus far, mounted any effective resistance to the proliferation of sectarian jihadi-militant groups, and extremist formations that openly preach hatred and engage in extreme acts of violence. State inaction in the face of the targeted killing of Shias has sent out the alarming message that the Federal and Provincial Governments won’t act to protect their religious and sectarian minorities, particularly the Shias.
  Amidst rapid radicalisation, on July 14, 2011, Pakistan’s Supreme Court ordered the release of Malik Ishaq – the former operational chief of LeJ, who was involved in 44 cases involving the killing of at least 70 people, mostly belonging to the Shia sect – on bail from Lahore’s Kot Lakhpat Jail, because of the prosecution’s failure to produce sufficient evidence to support its charges. Since Ishaq’s release, attacks on Shias have increased across Pakistan, and particularly in Quetta. According to media reports, an official of the Interior Ministry disclosed, on condition of anonymity, that the Ministry had received some intelligence reports that the organisation had stepped up its anti-Shia campaign after Ishaq’s release and the February 10, 2012, release of Ghulam Rasool Shah, another co-accused in various cases of sectarian strife and terrorism.
  Anti-Shia extremist groups and Sunni terrorist formations such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) share their larger goals of making “Pakistan a graveyard for the Shias” and “exterminating the community from Pakistan by 2012,” in the words of a June 2011 LeJ pamphlet. LeJ, the breakaway faction of the Sipah--e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), in June 2011, distributed pamphlets calling Shias “wajib-ul-qatl” (obligatory to be killed), and also issued an open letter against the Hazara-Shia community in Quetta. The letter of the Balochistan Unit of the outfit read,

  All Shias are wajib-ul-qatl. We will rid Pakistan of the unclean race. The real meaning of Pakistan is pure land and Shias have no right to live here. We have the fatwa (religious edict) and signatures of the ulama (religious scholar) in which the Shias have been declared kaafir [infidel]. Just as our fighters have waged a successful jihad against the Shia-Hazaras in Afghanistan, our mission [in Pakistan] is the abolition of this impure sect, the Shias and the Shia-Hazaras, from every city, every village, every nook and corner of Pakistan...

  Based in the Punjab province, LeJ operates in the restive region of Balochistan in close alliance with other Sunni militant groups such as TTP, SSP, al Qaeda and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM). SSP summarised a fatwa allegedly issued by various ulama from Pakistan and Bangladesh in May 2011, which was found in a Wahhabi madrassa (religious seminary) Darul Uloom Imdadia, in Mariabad sub-valley of Quetta. The fatwa titled, ‘Shias are Kaafir (Infidel); Treat them like non-Muslims’ and issued by a Deobandi Maulana, Hazrat Maulana Wali Hasan, ‘Mufti-e-Azam, Pakistan’, from Karachi, further fuelled the flames of the boiling cauldron of sectarian hatred. It iterates:

  Shia Ithna Ashari (Twelver Shias, who believe in that twelve Imams are divinely ordained) are rafzi (deviant) kafirs (infidels). Their sect is deviated and burying them in Muslim graveyards is haram. Hence, they should be treated as non-Muslims..

  Exploiting the old faultlines of Shia-Sunni rivalry and the anti-Shia sentiment in Pakistani society since the 1980’s, the orthodox Sunni ulama and their religious organisations have legitimised anti-Shia rhetoric and violence with the state’s support.
  In addition to SSP-LeJ nexus, both these outfits have close links with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in their common agenda of targeting Shias. The SSP-LeJ liaison also has links with sectarian- terrorist groupings such as Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Harkat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islami (HuJI), which work in close collaboration with TTP and al Qaeda.  There is a distinct overlap in the membership of these groups, and a dovetailing of Sunni Islamist extremist and sectarian ideologies. 
  Adding to this nucleus of extremist-terrorist outfits is the close connectedness between Sunni extremist groups and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). According to a December 2011 statement by Human Rights Watch (HRW),

  Some Sunni extremist groups are known to have links to the Pakistani military and its intelligence agencies. Groups such as the banned Lashkar-e Jhangvi operate with impunity even in areas where state authority is well established, such as Punjab province and the port city of Karachi. In Balochistan, where local militants challenge Government authority and elsewhere across Pakistan, law enforcement officials have failed to intervene or prevent attacks on Shia and other vulnerable groups.

  Pakistan is being wrecked by the enduring catastrophe of jihadi and sectarian extremism, certainly under the benign neglect or tolerance, and in many cases, the active encouragement, collusion and support, of state agencies. Unless the substructure of institutionally encouraged, and now widely-shared, ideologies of hatred is dismantled, there is little hope that the relentless and savage campaigns against religious and sectarian minorities in the country will ease.
   

Maoists: Enduring Strengths Ajai Sahni Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management & SATP

In quick succession, three disruptive incidents have shocked India out of the complacency that had set in, as the policy establishment celebrated sharp declines in violence and fatalities engineered by the Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-Maoist), over the past year.

The worst of these incidents was, of course, the March 27, 2012, improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) transport at Pustola in Gadchiroli District, Maharashtra, which killed 12 and injured 28. In their enthusiasm during CRPF Director General Vijay Kumar’s visit to Fulbodi Gatta to inspect a Community Outreach Programme, the troopers had ignored standard operating procedures (SOPs), driving over a road that had not been sanitized in advance. The Maoists were quick to take bloody advantage.

A loss of lives among SF personnel, however, is easily ignored and quickly forgotten by the Indian state. The abduction of foreigners and the inevitable international media carnival that follows, tends to be far more embarrassing, for much longer, especially when the ‘hostage drama’ extends over weeks. The ‘arrest’ as the Maoists chose to describe it, of two Italians – a tourist and a tour operator – on March 14, 2012, in the Daringbadi Block of Kandhamal District, Odisha, has, consequently, shattered the illusion of an ‘improved internal security situation’ to a far greater extent. While one of the hostages, Claudio Colangelo, was released on March 25, 2012, the second, tour operator Paulo Basusco, continues to be held hostage by the rebels at the time of writing. The abduction occurred while the Italians were moving in areas of Maoist influence, officials claim, against the advice of the administration.

Even as the Italian hostage drama was being played out, a Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA), tribal leader Jhina Hikaka, from the ruling Biju Janata Dal (BJD), was abducted on March 24, 2012, near Laxmipur in Koraput District, Odisha, when he chose to ignore security procedures, to travel through Maoist dominated territories from Semilguda to his constituency, Laxmipur. Hikaka’s vehicle was stopped near Toyaput, and he was abducted after he identified himself.

The Basusco and Hikaka abductions remain unresolved at the time of writing.

Crucially, all three actions were incidents of opportunity, reflecting enduring Maoist capacities, rather than strategic intent or planning, and demonstrating quite clearly that a decline in fatalities is not synonymous with a decline in rebel capacities or with an improvement in the ‘security situation’. Indeed, despite the significant reverses inflicted on the Maoists, especially at the leadership level, as well as some contraction in their areas of operation, the rebels’ disruptive capabilities in their core areas along the purported ‘Red Corridor’, remain substantially intact.

Despite many claims of the cumulative ‘improvement’ in the capacities of central and State Security Forces (SFs), the state’s vulnerabilities remain largely unaddressed. At least some claims of such ‘improvement’ are, in any event, largely falsified or fabricated - including the Union Ministry of Home Affairs’ (UMHA) November 30, 2011, claim that the police-population ratio had been raised to 176 per 100,000, from an National Crime Records Bureau figure of 133 per 100,000 as on December 31, 2010. Others, such as UMHA’s claims of “significant measures taken to strengthen the Indian Police Service” (IPS) remain something of a smokescreen, since existing deficits in the Service will take decades to fill, even with dramatically accelerated intakes. UMHA also claims that “Number of CAPF (Central Armed Police Force) battalions deployed in LWE (Left Wing Extremist) affected States increased from 37 in 2008 to 73 in November 2011, glossing over the fact that this has roughly been the level of deployment since the disastrous ‘massive and coordinated operations’ were launched by the Centre in end-2009. That these Forces have, along with State Police Special Forces, largely been frozen in a passive defensive posture since the Chintalnad massacre of April 2010, and that offensive operations against the Maoist have now become more and more the exception among demoralized SF contingents, remains unsaid.

On the other hand, the anecdotal evidence of state vulnerabilities and disarray is mounting. In one devastating disclosure, the UMHA conceded that as many as 46,000 officers and personnel took voluntary retirement from the CAPF between 2007 and September 2011, while another 5,220 officers and personnel resigned from service over the same period. 461 suicides and 64 instances of fratricides were also recorded. Worse, UMHA noted that the rate of increase of cases of resignation in the CRPF and Border Security Force (BSF) was “alarming”, at more than 70 per cent in 2011, over 2010.

If this dry data was not sufficiently disconcerting, Rahul Sharma, an IPS officer, serving as a Superintendent of Police in the Maoist afflicted Bilaspur District, in the country’s worst affected State, Chhattisgarh, committed suicide on March 12, 2012, blaming his seniors and the political leadership for his decision. Sharma had reportedly confided in a friend that he was frustrated because Police officers were required to do what he called ‘forced labour’ (begaar), and ‘extortion’ (ugahi) and that ‘targets for election expenses’ for the scheduled 2013 Assembly Elections had ‘already been set’. This incident provides extraordinary insight into the use and morale of the Police leadership in the State worst affected by the Maoist insurgency.

Nor is Chhattisgarh an exception. In the wake of the March 27 incident in Gadchiroli, Maharashtra Home Minister R.R. Patil complained that Police officers were ‘unwilling’ to work in the Maoist afflicted Gadchiroli and Chandrapur Districts, citing the recent example of four Police Sub-inspectors, who resigned from the Force after completing training, when they were posted to Gadchiroli. Patil had nothing but a litany of complaints to offer after the Gadchiroli incident, blaming the Centre for a failure to give advance information of Maoist attacks. Unsurprisingly, Maharashtra saw an increase in Maoist related fatalities to 69 in 2011, over the 2010 figure of 40, even as the all-India fatalities almost halved (from 1180 to 602).

The other principal Maoist affected States, Odisha, Jharkhand, West Bengal and Bihar suffer from equal and endemic deficiencies in their security structures, as well as from both ambivalence and infirmity in their political leaderships.

In another shock to the system, and testimony to the incompetence and incapacity of the state establishment, Kobad Ghandy, a CPI-Maoist Politburo member and top party ideologue, was discharged by a Sessions Court for offences under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), due to procedural defects in the prosecution. Ghandy was a prize catch, trapped in Delhi on September 20, 2009, after a protracted operation led by the Andhra Pradesh Special Intelligence Branch, and involving the Intelligence Bureau and Delhi Police. The Sessions Judge, Pawan Kumar Jain, observed,

I am of the considered opinion that there is sufficient material on record to make out a prima facie case for the offence punishable under Sections 20 and 38 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act against accused Kobad Ghandy. But since the cognisance order dated February 19, 2010, qua the offences punishable under the UAPA was not in accordance with the mandatory provisions of Section 45(2) of the UAPA, I hereby discharge accused Kobad Ghandy for the offences punishable under Section 10/13/18/20/38 of the UAPA. Similarly, I also discharge accused Rajinder Kumar for the offences punishable under Section 10/13/18/19/20 UAPA. However, there is sufficient material on record to make out a prima facie case against both the accused for the offences punishable under Section 419/420/468/474/120B Indian Penal Code.

Some augmentation of capacities – recruitment, arming, fortification and modernization – has, no doubt, occurred across the board, both in CAPF and State Forces, but this has had, at best, limited impact on SF capacities and operations on the ground as a result of an incoherence of approach and strategy, as well as gross deficits and deficiencies in leadership.

The declining trend in Maoist-related fatalities has, nevertheless, continued into the early months of 2012, with a total of 96 fatalities between January and March, as against 174 over the same period last year. The ‘incidents of opportunity’ in March 2012, however, are evidence of abiding Maoist strengths, and the continuing infirmity of state responses. Declining trends in fatalities and occasional reverses not-withstanding, it appears that the initiative remains firmly in the hands of the Maoists, and that State leaderships are still to find the will and the clarity of perspective that will allow them to secure any enduring dominance over areas of rebel disruption.

Terrorism is not a problem india-pak but also for human.

The South Asia Terrorism Portal (www.satp.org) was launched in March 2000, with an initial 1,921 pages of data and information. By 2010, this database had already grown to over 52,148 pages.
SATP is the largest website on terrorism and low intensity warfare in South Asia, and creates the database and analytic context for research and analysis of all extremist movements in the region. SATP has been set up to counter the progressive distortions regarding, and the international community’s neglect of, the wide range of terrorist movements within South Asia, and particularly in India. SATP establishes a comprehensive, searchable and continuously updated database on all available information relating to terrorism, low intensity warfare and ethnic/communal/sectarian strife in South Asia.
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